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1. Introduction
 The US-Japan relationship from the 1970’s to the 1990’s was characterized 
by economic confl icts over Japanese exports to and investment in the US. The US 
had a larger trade defi cit with Japan than with any other country. The issues ranged 
from confl icts over specifi c industries – e.g. textiles, steel, and automobiles – to 
macroeconomic policy. The US continued to search for an effective trade policy 
to reduce its trade defi cit with Japan. The relationship reached a very low point. 
But since 1995, the economic confl ict has become increasingly nominal and the 
economic relationship has become stable since 2000.
 This study begins by focusing on the historical development of US trade 
policy toward Japan from the 1970’s to the 1990’s and some factors that have 
resolved the economic confl ict. The US has always taken the lead in economic 
negotiations with Japan. So, we must focus on US trade policy toward Japan to 
understand the larger economic confl ict. Then we will discuss the historical legacy 
of this economic confl ict and its implications for the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership 
(TPP) negotiations. 
 New trade negotiations between the US and Japan have begun since Japan 
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joined the TPP negotiations in July of 2013. The Obama Administration considers 
the TPP negotiations the most important tool to expand US exports. For example, 
President Barack Obama announced in the 2013 State of the Union Address, “To 
boost American exports, support American jobs and level the playing fi eld in the 
growing markets of Asia, we intend to complete negotiations on a Trans-Pacifi c 
Partnership” (Obama 2013). The Obama administration is trying to win many 
more concessions from Japan by using the combination of the TPP negotiations 
and separate bilateral negotiations with Japan. On the other hand, there are some 
groups that oppose the TPP negotiations. They criticize the Abe Administration, 
arguing that the Japanese economy will be exploited and destroyed by the US 
through the TPP and that the Japanese government is stupidly subordinating 
Japan’s interests to those of the US.
 When we consider the TPP negotiations and their future, as a prerequisite we 
have to research the historical development of US trade policy toward Japan and 
its implications.
 In this paper, I survey US trade policy toward Japan from the 1970’s to the 
1990’s, and in sections 2 and 3, I will show the historic trade policy change that 
took place during the second term of the Reagan Administration. In its fi rst term, 
the Reagan Administration requested Japan to carry out trade liberalization with-
out threatening protectionist measures if Japan did not comply. But in the second 
term, the Reagan Administration demanded that Japan reform its economic struc-
ture and adopt government-managed trade by using protectionist measures to 
bring about changes in Japanese trade policy1). This policy change established the 
US trade policy framework toward Japan after the Reagan Administration. And in 
Section 4, we analyze some factors in the US-Japan economic confl ict that have 
been settled and the historical legacy of this confl ict. Then, in Section 5, we will 
discuss some implications for the TPP negotiations.
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2. The US-Japan Economic Confl ict: First Phase
 The US-Japan economic confl ict from the 1970’s to the beginning of the 
1980’s was characterized by friction over individual products. The typical pattern 
of the confl ict was the following: expansion of exports to the U.S. of specifi c 
products by Japan created dissatisfaction among the US companies in these prod-
uct areas. These companies requested Congress and the Administration to restrict 
imports from Japan. Congress and the Administration pressed the Japanese gov-
ernment to solve the problem. Under the pressure from the US, Japan executed 
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). On the other hand, the US demanded that 
Japan expand imports of US products, too. Japan removed trade barriers, includ-
ing the reduction of tariffs, gradually. However, it did not lead to a radical solution, 
and the dissatisfi ed US pressed the Japanese government again. This was the typi-
cal pattern of US-Japan trade negotiations2).
 This pattern continued until the beginning of the 1980’s. But the product 
areas that were targeted in the US-Japan negotiations changed with advances in 
the industrial structure of the Japanese economy. The Japanese economy transi-
tioned from light industries (e.g. textiles) to heavy industries (e.g. steel) and 
assembly industries (e.g. household appliances) from the 1950’s to the 1970’s. 
And the economic confl ict occurred most notably in the automobile industry, 
which was the most important industry in the US. The VER that was exercised by 
Japanese automobile makers between May, 1981 and March, 1994 was the most 
symbolic source of friction in individual products. I highlight the US -Japan auto-
mobile confl ict and show the character of US trade policy toward Japan in the fi rst 
phase.
 The economic confl ict in the automobile industry intensifi ed in 1979 and 
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1980. Figure 1 shows the trend in automobile sales (domestic, imported and total) 
in the US from 1970 to 1980. The number of domestic and imported automobiles 
sales declined in 1974 and 1975 under the recession caused by the fi rst oil crisis. 
The real GDP growth rate was 5.8% in 1973, but it declined to -0.6% in 1974 and 
-0.2% in 19753). But automobile sales increased after 1976 because of industry 
recovery, and the number of automobile sales from 1976 to 1979 was over ten 
million every year. 
 In this recovery process, imported car sales increased rapidly. The number of 
imported car sales increased by about 0.83 million between 1976 and 1979. Their 
market share in the US expanded from 14.8% in 1976 to 21.8% in 1979. On the 
other hand, domestic car sales increased by 1978, but decreased after 1979. In 
particular, the number of domestic car sales declined greatly, by about 1.7 million, 
from 1979 to 1980. As a result, imported cars had 26.7% market share in 1980. 
Most of the imported cars were made in Japan. The market share of Japanese cars’ 
had grown rapidly from 12.2% in 1977 to 21.26% in 1980 (Nanto 1985, p.64).
Figure 1  Number of automobile sales (in thousands)
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 This situation had a big impact on the profi tability of US automobile makers. 
Figure 2 shows the trend in profi ts of four US automobile makers (GM, Ford, 
Chrysler and American Motors). Their profi ts seriously declined from 1979 to 
1980. They had to lay employees off. The number of employees related to the 
automobile industry decreased from about 1 million in 1978 to about 0.79 million 
(Bass 1985, p.12). This created a large class of jobless persons. In particular, it had 
a big impact on the Midwest region where the factories of automobile makers 
were concentrated. For example, the unemployment rate in Michigan, which had 
the highest number of employees related to the automobile industry, was greater 
than the US national average. In 1978, the unemployment rate was 7.1% in 
Michigan and 6.4% nationally - the two rates were similar. But in 1980, the unem-
ployment rate was 9.6% in Michigan and 6.3% in the US as a whole. The gap 
between Michigan and the US national average was expanding4).
 The US automobile makers faced a very severe management environment 
Figure 2  Profi t of the US automobile makers, from 1970 to 1980 (in millions)
Source: Bass [1985], pp.14-15.
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from 1979 to 1980. So, the Japanese automobile makers that were their main 
rivals were criticized and attacked by the US automobile makers and the United 
Automobile Workers (UAW). They strongly lobbied Congress and the Carter 
Administration to adopt protectionist measures against Japanese car imports. 
Thus, the economic problem was politicized. 
 The UAW requested the Japanese automobile makers to reduce exports and 
promote direct investment in the US. Douglas Frazer, who was president of the 
UAW, visited Japan in 1980 and had some meetings about these requests with 
Japanese automobile makers and Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. Also, the US 
automobile makers demanded that Congress and the Carter Administration help 
them. As a result, many protectionist bills against Japan were introduced in 
Congress. For example, Senator John Danforth and Lloyd Bentsen submitted a 
bill in the Senate in February 1981 that placed a limit on annual Japanese automo-
bile imports of 1.6 million (Winham and Kabashima 1982). 
 Corresponding with this movement was the election of President Reagan in 
1980. During the presidential campaign, Reagan made a speech at Chrysler’s 
Jefferson Plant in Michigan on September 2, 1980. 
“There is a place where government can be legitimately involved - and this 
is where I think government has a role that it has shirked so far - and that is 
to convince the Japanese that, in one way or another and in their own best 
interest, the deluge of their cars into the United States must be slowed while 
our industry gets back on its feet” (Kneeland 1980).  
  Presidential candidate Reagan mentioned in this speech the possibility of 
restricted or regulated automobile imports from Japan. Inside the Reagan 
Administration, free traders and protectionists, who wanted to impose limitations 
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on Japanese automobile imports, argued over the best course of action. President 
Reagan was a free-trader and hesitated to adopt protectionist policies5). But fi nally 
he requested the Japanese government to carry out a VER of automobiles so that 
he could control the protectionists in Congress. And the VER was executed by the 
Japanese automobile makers starting in May of 1981. Also, the Reagan 
Administration pushed Japan to expand US car imports and promote direct invest-
ment in the US.
 As I mentioned, in the fi rst phase, the following pattern was created. The 
increase in exports from Japan to the US led to increased pressure for protectionist 
measures from individual industries, Congress, and the administration. Finally, 
corresponding with these pressures, Japan executed its VER. And the US contin-
ued to request the expansion of imports from the US into Japan (Destler 2005, 
pp.77-79). The automobile industry was the most typical case.  
 This fi rst phase, however, is distinguished from the second at two points. 
First, the economic confl ict was confi ned to individual products. The macro eco-
nomic structure in Japan was not a problem. Second, the US didn’t claim a 
numerical import target in Japan by utilizing protectionist measures. The US did 
not pursue government-managed trade. Its basic posture was to press Japan for 
trade liberalization and import expansion by negotiations to the last.
 For example, the principles of the Reagan Administration’s trade policy 
toward Japan during the fi rst term was summarized by the following fi ve points6).
“1. Obtaining overall access for U.S. participation in the Japanese economy in 
goods, services, and investment similar to that which Japan enjoys in the 
U.S. economy.
2. Ensuring trade composition and volume which refl ect U.S. 
competitiveness.
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3. Ensuring fair competition between U.S. and Japanese fi rms in U.S., 
Japanese, and third country markets, and eliminating distortive or disrup-
tive effects that may arise from Japanese Government industrial policies or 
corporate practices.
4. Avoiding protectionist measures.
5. Inducing Japanese leadership in free trade commensurate with Japanese 
economic strength and Japan's stake in the system.” 
 These principles focused on expanding exports to Japan and rejecting protec-
tionist measures against Japan. They did not set a numerical target connected with 
government-managed trade. The Reagan Administration in the fi rst term fi rmly 
continued to demand that Japan carry out trade liberalization and expand imports 
from the US without using protectionism. But US exports to Japan did not increase. 
The VER alone was not enough. The US strongly wanted to expand its exports to 
Japan. The US trade policy toward Japan dramatically changed during the Reagan 
Administration’s second term.
3. The US-Japan Economic Confl ict: Second Phase
 The Reagan Administration reconsidered its trade policy toward Japan in 
preparing for the second term. The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 
151 that was proposed on December 10, 1984, requested a review of US policy 
toward Japan and the formulation of a new strategy to coincide with Prime 
Minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone’s visit to the US on January 2, 19857). 
Therefore, United States Trade Representative William E. Brock and Secretary of 
Commerce Malcolm Baldrige submitted the trade policy toward Japan review to 
the president8). This review assessed the trade policy during the fi rst term and 
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proposed the new trade policy. It clearly marked a turning point in US trade policy 
toward Japan. 
 The review noted the problem that the US trade defi cit with Japan continued 
to grow and US exports to Japan did not increase. According to the review, “We 
recognize that for structural reasons Japan will inevitably run a trade surplus with 
US.” Removing these ‘structural reasons’ was the most important target of the 
new US trade policy toward Japan. 
 Furthermore, this review characterized trade policy toward Japan in the fi rst 
term as “Negotiation by persuasion”. The principle was that the US would per-
suade Japan to remove some trade barriers in the Japanese market, promote trade 
liberalization, and expand imports from the US. And the US was able to win some 
trade system reforms in Japan. But US exports to Japan did not grow. This review 
identifi ed three reasons. The fi rst was that implementation of the promised policy 
was very slow. The second was that Japan maintained trade barriers against the 
industries in which US companies were highly competitive. The third was that 
new barriers or policies restricting trade were introduced. Moreover, the most 
important factor was that the Japanese government only responded to pressure and 
requests from the US. When this pressure was eased, Japan did not liberalize its 
trade policies or remove its barriers. As a result, US exports to Japan did not 
increase and tensions between the US and Japan over trade issues increased again. 
This negative pattern continued to repeat. So, “We have concluded that a new 
approach is needed in our trade policy toward Japan”.
 The new approach was composed of three points. The fi rst involved request-
ing that Japan reform the economic structure of some important selected industrial 
sectors and expand imports from the US. The second was that if Japan refused to 
reform or implement the changes the US requested, the US would use protection-
ist measures as ‘leverage’. The third was to obtain a commitment from Prime 
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Minister Nakasone to carry out a national goal of doubling imports of manufac-
tured commodities from foreign countries.
 These three points showed the change in trade policy toward Japan. In the 
fi rst term, the trade issues were confi ned to confl icts over individual goods, and 
the threat of protectionism was not the main method for achieving US goals. As a 
result, US exports to Japan did not increase and the trade defi cit with Japan 
expanded. So, in the second term, the Reagan Administration focused on the con-
fl ict over individual products and the economic structure in Japan behind the 
confl ict. And they pursued the reform of the economic structure and expanding 
exports to Japan by using protectionist measures as the main tool in the negotia-
tions. A numerical import target by Japan was examined as an important solution. 
In the fi rst term, the Reagan Administration was on guard against retaliatory pro-
tectionist measures by Congress. But, in the second term, by making full use of 
protectionist measures, they tried to force Japan to implement the US request. The 
Reagan Administration’s trade policy changed in the second term, and this was a 
historical turning point.
 President Reagan agreed to this strategy. Under this approach, President 
Reagan requested Prime Minister Nakasone to do two things at the meeting on 
January 2, 1985. The fi rst was that the US and Japan negotiate to expand imports 
from the US, in particular “telecommunication, electronics, forest products, medi-
cal equipment, pharmaceuticals”. Second, that Japan commit to a national import 
goal. And President Reagan insisted that if US exports to Japan did not increase, 
he would not be able to prevent the passage of protectionist measures against 
Japan9). And as a result of this meeting, the Market Oriented Sector Selective 
(MOSS) negotiations were created. In the MOSS negotiations, the US and Japan 
identifi ed the selective sectors proposed by President Reagan in the meeting and 
discussed structural reform in Japan and its numerical import target. The 
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numerical import target was not settled at these negotiations. But the US and 
Japan agreed to reduce tariffs and reform various institutions and laws in Japan. 
And Prime Minister Nakasone appealed to the Japanese people to buy US goods10) 
and simultaneously established the “Advisory Group on Economic Structural 
Adjustment for International Harmony” on examining the reform to expand 
imports from foreign countries in October 1985 (the report, called the “Maekawa 
Report”, was published in April 1986).11) Prime Minister Nakasone showed his 
commitment to increasing imports from the US as a national target.
 The MOSS negotiations involved two policy issues for US trade policy 
toward Japan. These two options created the fundamental framework of the trade 
policy after the MOSS negotiations.
 The fi rst was the request for government-managed trade. The US tried to 
force Japanese companies to buy US goods through a numerical import target. In 
the MOSS negotiations, the US pressed Japan to introduce this target. In the 
US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement in 1986, the US requested Japan to intro-
duce this target and succeeded in introducing it in the side letter of this agreement. 
When this agreement was renewed in 1991, the agreement included a new numeri-
cal target (Kondo 2011, pp.60-67). After that, the US continued to request it. In 
particular, the Clinton Administration preferred this option. The negotiations over 
automobile parts in 1995 created a big clash between the US and Japan because of 
the US request for a numerical target.  
 The second was the reform of Japan’s economic structure. The Reagan 
Administration thought the reason US exports to Japan had not increased was the 
problem of Japan’s economic structure. So if this structure did not change, US 
exports would never grow. The MOSS negotiations were based on this view, and 
the US requested Japan to carry out structural economic reform. And this view 
was shared by successive administrations. The scope of negotiations expanded 
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from trade barriers to the macroeconomic structure in Japan. Bilateral negotia-
tions about these topics were commenced in the 1990’s. The Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII, 1989-1991) and the US-Japan Framework for a New Economic 
Partnership (1993-1994) were illustrative features of these negotiations. For 
example, the US identifi ed the topics of saving and investment patterns, land 
policy, distribution of commodities, exclusionary business practices, Keiretsu 
relationships, and Pricing Mechanisms in SII12). 
 These two issues- government-managed trade and the economic structure 
problem - became the basis of US trade policy toward Japan after the second half 
of the 1980’s13).
4. The End of the Economic Confl ict
 The automobile negotiations in 1995 were the climax. After that, the 
US-Japan economic confl ict became nominal, and the US has not put strong pres-
sure on Japan about trade issues since then. Today, the US-Japan economic 
relationship is stable. We can confi rm this point based on a public opinion poll 
titled “Image of Japan Study in the U.S.” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
(the implementing agency was the Gallup Organization). 
 Figure 3 shows the trend in the percentage of respondents who perceived 
Japan as a dependable ally or friend in the US from 1977 to 2012. According to 
Figure 3, the perceived reliability of Japan decreased in 1981, 1983 and 1987-
1994. And since 1995, it has been increasing, reaching 84% in 2012. Figure 4 
shows the trend in the evaluation of the present level of US-Japan cooperation in 
general ratings of positive responses, either “good” or “excellent,”’ from 1985 to 
2012. This data trend is the same as that in Figure 3. The percentage of “good” and 
“excellent” evaluations decreased from 1987 and the bottom was 26% in 1994. 
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After that, it continued to improve, reaching 80% in 2012. Both trends have con-
tinued to improve since 1995. 
 In the background of this improvement, there is the recognition that the eco-
nomic problem is not an important issue in US-Japan relations. This point can be 
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Figure 4  Present level of US-Japan cooperation (%) 
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Figure 3  Perception of Japan as a dependable ally or friend in the US (%)
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confi rmed by Table 1. Respondents were asked to identify “The way which would 
most improve relations between the U.S. and Japan” from1995 to 2007. In 1995, 
the percentage of “Improve economic/trade relations” answers was the largest: 
63%. We have no data before 1995, but we can infer a similar situation before 
1995 because the economic confl ict between the US and Japan was more serious 
then. After 1995, the percentage of respondents identifying this factor above all 
declined to 36% in 2007, and other factors - global cooperation, political/security 
relations and cultural exchange - have become more important. 
 Moreover, the perception of the economic problem between the US and Japan 
Table 1  The way that would most improve relations between the U.S. and Japan (%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Improve economic/
trade relations 63 60 52 52 53 46 42 41 35 42 38 36 36
Increase global 
cooperation 22 24 22 22 21 24 24 22 22 23 26 28 30
Strengthen political/
security relations 12 12 13 16 15 18 19 25 32 25 25 21 25
Promote cultural 
exchanges 9 8 9 9 10 9 8 7 9 12 8
Others 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1
Source: Same of Figure 3.
Table 2  Main Reasons for Japan - U.S. Trade Imbalance (%) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
closed nature of 
Japanese market 58 55 52 52 55 51 44 43 43 37 34 29 32
macro- economic 
discrepancies in 
both counties
20 22 23 23 22 25 26 28 26 27 29 30 26
U.S. industries' 
weak 
competitiveness 
17 17 18 19 17 17 21 21 23 29 30 33 35
Source: Same of Figure 3.
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changed dramatically. Table 2 asked for the “Main Reasons for Japan - U.S. Trade 
Imbalance” from 1995 to 2007. More than 50% of people answered that the most 
important cause was the “closed nature of Japanese market” from 1995 to 2000. 
After that, its percentage decreased to 32% in 2007 and other factors, “macro-
economic discrepancies in both counties” and “U.S. industries' weak 
competitiveness” have become more important. 
 According to these polls, as the US-Japan economic confl ict stabilized since 
1995, the US-Japan relationship improved. The US-Japan relationship greatly 
depends on the economic relationship. 
 Thus, the US-Japan relationship has become stable since 1995. I want to 
indicate fi ve causes.
 First, the Japanese economy is declining and the Chinese economy is rising. 
Since the bursting of the bubble economy in 1991, the Japanese economy has 
become weak. On the other hand, the Chinese economy is growing rapidly. The 
GDP of China has become the second largest in the world, ahead of Japan’s. The 
percentage of the US trade defi cit that Japan occupied has declined from 70.8% in 
1981, which was its peak, to 9.4% in 2010. On the other hand, the percentage 
occupied by China, which surpassed Japan in 2000, is now the largest. This per-
centage reached 43.1% in 201014). Clearly, the US trade defi cit with Japan has 
decreased and that with China has increased. So, the US-China economic confl ict 
is the most important trade issue for the US now. 
 The second reason is the increase in direct investment by Japanese companies 
in the US. These companies have constructed factories and created a lot of jobs. 
The most illustrative example is the automobile industry. Figure 5 compares the 
automobile production by Japanese automobile makers in the US with the number 
of automobiles exported from Japan. Japanese automobile makers began to invest 
in the US during the 1980’s (Sei 1987). Their car production in the US grew 
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signifi cantly. In 1993, the number of Japanese cars made in the US surpassed the 
number exported from Japan. Today, the US is the one of the export bases of 
Japanese automobile makers (Prusa 2013). 
 The third is the use of the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO. The 
WTO, which was established in 1995, has a stronger trade dispute settlement 
system than that of GATT. In the case of US-Japan negotiations, the Japanese 
position was very weak because the Japanese economy and security depended on 
the US market and military. But using the WTO’s multilateral negotiations, Japan 
was able to achieve an equal position to the US because one-sided sanctions, such 
as protectionist measures, are prohibited by the WTO agreement. Also, instead of 
the investigations based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the US has 
recently come to use the dispute settlement system of the WTO. The US presented 
93 cases to the WTO between 1995 and 2009 (Suzuki 2013, p.5). 
 The fourth is the change in the US industrial structure. Figure 6 shows the 
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trend in industry value added as percentage of GDP from the 1950’s to the 2000’s. 
We can see the shift in the center of the US industrial base in Figure 6. 
“Manufacturing” was the core industry in the US from the 1950’s to the 1970’s. 
But the share of “Manufacturing” was surpassed by that of “Finance, insurance, 
real estate, rental and leasing” from the 1980’s to the 1990’s. The share of 
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‘Professional and business service’ and ‘Educational services, health care, and 
social assistance’ increased during the 1990’s. The core of the US industrial struc-
ture changed from the manufacturing to the fi nancial sector and service industry. 
As the importance of manufacturing decreased, the importance of the economic 
confl ict over manufacturing decreased. On the other hand, for the fi nancial sector 
and service industry, the systems and laws in foreign countries are becoming more 
important. 
 The fi fth was the change in the US international economic policy. Until the G. 
H. W. Bush Administration, the trade defi cit was the most important issue in inter-
national economic policy. But the Clinton Administration, in its second term, 
attached greater importance to capital fl ows to the US than to the trade defi cit. The 
CEA[1997] clearly articulated this position. The CEA[1997] reported that “trade 
defi cits and surpluses are primarily determined by macroeconomic factors, in par-
ticular the balance between domestic saving and investment”. Furthermore, “A 
current account defi cit merely means that a country is, on balance, borrowing from 
the rest of the world”. So, the important thing was how to use this borrowed 
money. How was the borrowed money used in the US? It was “fi nancing a surge 
in U.S. investment, particularly in business equipment” and “the implication is 
that the improving economy will continue to grow and will generate the resources 
necessary to repay our net borrowing from the rest of the world” (CEA 1997, pp. 
251-52). In short, the US economy was booming and needed a lot of funds for 
investment. But domestic saving was in short supply. So, a lot of money fl ew into 
the US from foreign countries and the US bought a lot of goods from overseas. 
Consequently, the US had a large trade defi cit. From this view, the trade defi cit 
was not a problem. The most important issue was to ensure continuing capital 
fl ows to the US. But this policy stance created a new problem: global imbalance. 
 The US-Japan economic confl ict became calm because of these fi ve factors. 
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And many Americans came to regard the US-Japan relationship as good. 
 On the other hand, US-Japan economic negotiations have not ended. During 
the G. W. Bush Administration, the US and Japan agreed to the US-Japan 
Economic Partnership for Growth and discussed economic issues between the US 
and Japan from 2001 to 2008. The economic issues in the negotiations focused on 
the coordination of institutions and law. This means the US government has 
focused on the second issue, the reform of the economic structure, proposed by the 
Reagan Administration in the second term. The US requested Japan to reform its 
system and law, in particular the fi nancial and insurance markets, for reasons dis-
cussed in the fourth factor above. But the leverage of protectionist measures was 
not used by the US in these negotiations. The US-Japan economic relationship did 
not become worse.
 In this process, the most important implication is that the US trade policy 
toward Japan did not realize a decrease in the trade defi cit with Japan. The stabil-
ity of the US-Japan economic relationship was brought about by the change in the 
economic situation and policy in the both countries. But the US trade policy did 
not contribute to the solving of the economic confl ict, except to encourage the 
direct investment in the US by Japanese companies (Blonigen and Feenstra 1997). 
If anything, US trade policy focused on the interests of specifi c industry sectors at 
the cost of consumers in the US and Japan.
 For example, Japan’s VER was an international business cartel. Under the 
VER, supply was decreased and prices increased. As a result, US and Japanese 
companies benefi ted greatly. For example, Crandall[1984] showed that US and 
Japanese automobile makers saw large profi ts during the VER15). Also, the numeri-
cal import target along with government-managed trade after the Reagan 
Administration’s second term dealt a severe blow to the free trade system. 
Protectionism only promoted the interests of specifi c industrial groups and did not 
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enhance public welfare. This is further evidence that bilateral trade problems 
cannot be solved through protectionism. 
 On the other hand, Japan had a big problem too. The Japanese government 
put off responding to the US request that it cease the ineffi cient efforts to protect 
its closed market. Japan would have to open its market in order to enjoy free trade. 
The more important problem was that Japanese politicians and bureaucrats used 
the US pressure to enhance their own political power and promote their own 
political interests. They recognized the opportunity this pressure from the US 
afforded. On the one hand, they responded to the US request; on the other, they 
used the US pressures to implement the reform that they feared to propose to the 
Japanese people by themselves. Therefore, they missed the opportunity to explain 
to the Japanese people the importance of these reforms on their own merits. Also, 
to execute the VER and the numerical import target, the Japanese government 
needed to control its domestic industries. As a result, the power of the government 
against the companies was enhanced. The politicians and bureaucrats in Japan that 
learned the effect of this style will implement future reform by the same method. 
There is some possibility that this will have a negative impact on the US-Japan 
relationship in the future16).
 Moreover, using the US pressure created two “myths” in Japan, in particular 
for a nationalist and a Marxist. The fi rst “myth” was that the US forced Japan to 
reform its economic structure for the benefi t of US interests, and this caused the 
decline of the Japanese economy. The rhetorical use of the US pressure by the 
Japanese government established the conspiracy theory that the Japanese economy 
is being exploited by US “imperialism”. The second “myth” is that of the “stupid 
Japanese government”. This is the image of Japan as subordinate to the US. 
According to this “myth,” the stupid Japanese government acceded to all the US 
request and interests because they were unable to think for themselves. The work 
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of Ishihara and Morita[1989] is representative of this “myth”.
5. Implications for TPP negotiations
 The effects of the US-Japan economic are still visible today. I identify two 
points regarding the TPP negotiations.
 The fi rst involves the US trade policy framework toward Japan. This frame-
work, established by the Reagan Administration, has been kept largely unchanged 
by the Obama Administration. The TPP negotiations are a typical example of this 
framework17).
 Prime Minister Sinzo Abe announced Japan’s participation in the TPP nego-
tiations on March 15, 2013. Therefore, the Abe Administration needed to get an 
agreement from other participating countries, including the US. The US-Japan 
negotiations over participating in the TPP negotiations began and the Obama 
Administration agreed on April 12, 2013, that Japan could participate in the TPP 
negotiations. After that, Congress agreed to it. Then, the Japanese government that 
got the agreement of other participating countries in addition to the US joined the 
TPP negotiations on July 23, 201318). 
 In the US-Japan negotiations, the Obama Administration requested Japan to 
engage in bilateral negotiations in parallel to the TPP negotiations, and both coun-
tries agreed to it. So, the US-Japan negotiation framework is composed of the TPP 
negotiations and bilateral negotiations19). In the TPP negotiations, the goals are 
removing all tariff barriers and establishing a common rule in the non-tariff barri-
ers fi eld (investment, intellectual property rights, competition policies, labor, 
environment, and so on)20). The US-Japan bilateral negotiations are more impor-
tant because they show the character of the US trade policy toward Japan. 
 These bilateral negotiations are the place where the US requests that Japan 
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remove non-tariff barriers unilaterally. Topics in the negotiations include “a 
number of key non-tariff measures”, for example, the fi elds of automobiles, insur-
ance, transparency/trade facility, investment, intellectual property rights, 
standards, government procurement, competition policies, express delivery, and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures21). These topics are divided between the 
interests of specifi c industry sectors and other non-tariff barriers, regulations, and 
laws. The joint statement by the US and Japan on February 22, 2013, stated that 
“more work remains to be done, including addressing outstanding concerns with 
respect to the automotive and insurance sectors, addressing other non-tariff mea-
sures”22). The automobile and insurance sectors were paid special attention. In 
these bilateral negotiations, we can fi nd the two issues mentioned above, the 
government-managed trade and structural economic reform, that were introduced 
in the 1980’s. The automobile and insurance areas are the target of the govern-
ment-managed trade negotiations, and the others fall under the requests for 
structural economic reform. In particular, the former will be the biggest problem. 
 So far, a numerical import target has not been proposed by the US. But both 
countries already agreed that the US will not remove its protection measures for 
the US automobile industry for a long time. So, the negotiation will focus on the 
importation of US cars by Japan. The Obama Administration will claim the com-
mitment by the Japanese government to increase imports from the US. It is very 
likely that the US will demand a numerical import target from Japan. If this policy 
is adopted, the consumers in both countries will suffer, like the situations I men-
tioned in Section 4. Both countries should learn the implications of the trade 
negotiations that took place in the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
 The second is the objection to the TPP negotiations in Japan. This objection 
has two bases. The fi rst is the following: if all tariffs are removed, agriculture in 
Japan will collapse because of the fl ood of exports from the US agricultural sector. 
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Agriculture has the multilateral roles of preserving the landscape, maintaining the 
heart of the community, and so on. If domestic agriculture declines, local rural 
areas will be in ruin. The Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives, which was 
the largest farmers association in Japan, strongly opposed the TPP negotiations 
based on this opinion.23) The second is the fear that the Japanese system is being 
changed into the American image under the TPP negotiations. For example, the 
Japanese Medical Association, composed of about 166,000 doctors, insists that 
the public health insurance system in Japan must be changed to look more like the 
US health care system, based on private health insurance (Yokokura 2013). 
Clearly, behind these two views are the two “myths” that I indicated in Section 4 
–exploitation by US “imperialism” and the “stupid Japanese government”. 
Opponents think as following: the US government has a sinister conspiracy and is 
trying to exploit the Japanese. And the Japanese government always obeys the US 
government. As a result, the Japanese economy will collapse because of the 
actions of both governments.
 This view from opponents is very different from the actual situation. But the 
succeeding cabinets in Japan have the responsibility of answering these objections 
because these opponents’ perception has been caused by the Japanese govern-
ment, which has used the US pressure rhetorically to achieve its own interests. But 
this stance of the Japanese government continues to this day. For example, the Abe 
Administration announced that it would supply a subsidy for reform and promote 
an export of products in the agricultural sector to protect it from the negative 
impact of the TPP. The structural reform of agriculture is an important policy. So 
the Abe Administration has to propose it regardless of US pressure. The stance 
that continues to use US pressure in the TPP negotiations will continue to distort 
the perception of the US in Japan. It will have a harmful impact on the US-Japan 
relationship. The Japanese government must propose these necessary reforms 
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without reference to foreign pressure. 
* This paper is the revised version of a research paper that was submitted to the Center for 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (CAPEC) of George Mason University in September 
2013. Also, this research was supported by Kansai University’s Overseas Research Program 
for academic year 2012. I appreciate all the support I received from CAPEC and Kansai 
University. And special thanks to Mr. Michael Sikorski for his help on this paper.
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